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THE ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCTION-CURRENT
CONSIDERATIONS UNDER REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
"Revenue Procedure 64-191 is the most important single ruling con-
cerning the allowance of the marital deduction.... It is must reading
for all lawyers and fiduciaries." 2 The strength of this statement indi-
cates the primacy to be accorded the Procedure. Its announcement
caused a veritable inundation of fear, speculation, and comment. In
response to its pronouncements attorneys hastened to rewrite or amend
clients' wills, authorities warned of drastic tax consequences for failure
to comply with its provisions, and state legislatures attempted to cure
apparent deficiencies in their laws.
The Procedure serves to delineate the nature of an interest which
qualifies for the marital deduction under particular circumstances; and
in effect, it places the tax benefits of the deduction in jeopardy where
there is a violation of its dictates. Thus, it is important that the attorney
who is involved in planning and administering estates possess substan-
tial understanding of the problems here involved, as well as their
remedies.
The following is an examination of the problem to which the Pro-
cedure is directed, the collateral questions which may arise, and the
available and potential solutions.
NxrURE AND USE OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
The marital deduction was established in 1948 for the purpose of
giving to estates in common law jurisdictions the same tax benefits en-
joyed by those in community property states.3 The relevant section of
the Internal Revenue Code4 provides that up to one-half of a decedent's
adjusted gross estate may pass to the surviving spouse free of estate
taxes.5 However, to qualify for this benefit the interest to which the
survivor succeeds must be similar in nature to that recognized in the
1. 1 CuM. BuLL. 682 (1964).
2. Lauritzen, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction, 103 TRusTs & ESTATES 318 (1964).
3. Note, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction-Revenue Procedure 64-19, 41 IND. L.J.
711,723 (1966).
4. INT. RFv. CoDE oF 1954, § 2056.
5. The adjusted gross estate is determined by subtracting from the gross estate
expenses, indebtedness, taxes and losses under §§ 2053 and 2054 of the Code. It is also
provided for in § 2056(c) (2) (A).
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spouse of a community property state, i.e., it must be a nonterminable
interest, ascertainable at the time of death.'
With these concepts in mind it would be useful to examine the
desires and status of the typical testator who will want to take advantage
of the marital deduction. He and his wife are happily married (for
convenience, the wife will be deemed to be the surviving spouse) and
they have one or more beloved children. If the wife is independently
wealthy the husband will give the children vested property interests to
be enjoyed immediately; otherwise he will employ the "two-trust" will,
giving the wife, and perhaps the children, the income from both trusts.
One of these will be the "marital trust," giving her at least a general
testamentary power of appointmentJ while the "family trust" will be
subject to any lesser interest in the wife, so that the corpus will not fall
into her gross estate upon her death.
Our typical testator also has four purposes which he is attempting to
effectuate by his will. The first, and most obvious, is to reap the tax
benefits of securing the maximum marital deduction.8 This he can ac-
complish by giving to the marital trust (or to the wife outright) a quali-
fying interest in at least one-half of the value of the adjusted gross
estate.
His second desire is to prevent "overfunding" the wife's interest. If
she takes more than the desired one-half (for example, if she is given
all the assets, ignoring the "two-trust" method) serious tax consequences
may ensue. The excess amount will presently be subject to estate taxes,9
and upon a later sale, gift or devise by the wife, it may again incur a tax.
This sort of "double taxation" can be avoided by judiciously apportion-
ing values between the spouse's interest and that of the other legatees.
Because of the improbability of accurately foreseeing subsequent fluc-
tuations in value, the testator may well want to use some kind of formula
clause which will permit so-called "post-mortem planning," by giving
the executor some discretion in selecting assets to satisfy the bequests.
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1), (b) (5), (e); Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-1,(b)-5 (1958).
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (5) provides that this is the minimum interest
which qualifies for the marital deduction.
8. For example, if the taxable estate is $500,000.02, the estate tax is $145,700. By utilizing
the maximum marital deduction, the taxable estate may be cut in half, to $250,000.01. The
estate tax would then be $65,700, an actual saving of $80,000 in estate taxes (tax rates
are found in hNr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2001).
9. Subject, of course, to the $60,000 exemption, which is deducted from the ad-
justed gross estate in determining the taxable estate. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2052.
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The achievement of flexibility, which is the third purpose of the hus-
band, also yields a facility of administration, especially where there
would otherwise result undesirable joint ownership, or a difficult division
of assets. And, if possible, the testator would employ some mode of post-
mortem planning which, although securing the full marital deduction,
might permit satisfaction of the marital gift with as little actual value as
possible (Revenue Procedure 64-19 is aimed at such a result).
The fourth goal is to prevent the estate from incurring a capital gains
tax. A capital gain will be recognized whenever a pecuniary (or "dollar
amount") bequest is satisfied in full with assets which have appreciated
in value since the date of valuation for federal estate tax purposes." The
logic behind this policy is that the legatee takes by purchase, not by
bequest, when the specific dollar amount is satisfied by, or exchanged
for, the distributed assets." Thus, if a $200,000 bequest may be satis-
fied with assets which, at the time of original valuation,, were worth only
$150,000, the estate has realized a $50,000 capital gain. To avoid incur-
ring a capital gains tax, the will might provide a method which will not
establish a specific dollar amount due. Another possibility is to require
the use of some standard other than distribution date values for satisfying
the bequest (in light of Revenue Procedure 64-19 such a standard may be
fatal in regard to allowance of the marital deduction).
MARITAL DEDUCTION CLAUSES
It would be helpful at this point to examine the different types of
clauses which have been employed to achieve the marital deduction, as
well as to consider the advantages and appropriateness of each in ful-
filling the wishes of the testator.
I. The bequest, or transfer in trust, of specific assets.
Under such a clause the fiduciary, of course, has no discretion in the
selection of assets, and the bequest or transfer (up to one-half) would
clearly qualify for the marital deduction. There is no capital gains
problem here, but the inflexibility of this type of clause could easily
result in "overfunding" the wife's interest. Furthermore, it would be
10. The date of valuation may be either the date of death, or the alternate date one
year thereafter. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 5 2032. Of course, in times of inflating values,
the executor will choose the death date for valuation purposes.
11. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1957); Rev. Rul. 56-270, 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 325;
Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 CuM. BuLL. 286; Commissioner v. Brinckerhoff, 168 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1948).
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most difficult to give the wife neither more nor less than would equal
the maximum marital deduction. Unless the surviving spouse is to take
a substantial (or entire) interest in the assets of the estate, the "specific
assets" approach is obviously precarious where values are certain to
fluctuate.
1H. The bequest, or transfer in trust, of a fractional share.
This type of clause gives the recipient an interest in a precise per-
centage of the estate (for example, a straight one-half, 2 or a percentage
to be determined by a formula). Any fluctuation in value will be shared
by each fractional interest. Since there is no specific dollar amount to be
satisfied, there can be no capital gains tax assessed against the estate upon
distribution of appreciated assets.'3 Of course, the testator should not use
such a clause where he wishes the spouse's interest to remain stable in
terms of value, regardless of asset appreciation or depreciation.
A fractional share approach theoretically allocates part of each asset
to the distributee, but if there will obviously be administrative prob-
lems 14 it would be desirable to draft a provision allowing the executor
some flexibility in distribution, the only requirement being that the
value finally received accurately reflect the fluctuation to be shared (such
a clause really converts the fractional share into a type of pecuniary
bequest, to be considered presently. It dictates that a certain value, to be
adjusted according to fluctuation, is due).
The following is a simple, yet effective, fractional share clause:
I give to the marital deduction trust that fraction of my residuary
estate which will reduce the federal estate tax falling due because of my
death to the lowest possible amount.' 5
12. Great care should be used when such fractional language is employed, for in-
discriminate use may result in construction of the gift as a specific dollar amount due,
and not a fractional share. For example, "an amount equal to one half of my adjusted
gross estate" will probably be deemed a pecuniary, rather than a fractional bequest.
Even "one half of my adjusted gross estate" may be so construed. See CASNER, EsTATE
PLANNiNG 795, n.27b (3d ed. 1961, Supp. 1965).
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1957).
14. For example, there may be some valuable real estate or a family corporation, in
which case allocating fractional owenrship may be difficult and undesirable.
15. From Wright, The Marital Deduction since Revenue Procedure 64-19, 106 TRusrs
& EsrA-ss 101 (1967).
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111. The pecuniary formula bequest, or transfer in trust, the amount to
be determined by estate tax values,16 to be satisfied 'with assets valued at
distribution date.
Under the pecuniary bequest the wife is entitled to a specific dollar
amount, which amount is determined by the formula employed. Thus
any appreciation or depreciation will be shared by the other legatees.
This type of clause permits some post-mortem planning because of the
discretion which the executor has in selecting assets to satisfy the
bequest. Thus it is conceivable that the fiduciary could distribute to the
wife wasting assets, or assets likely to depreciate in value, so that her
subsequent estate would not be unnecessarily inflated. Of course, if the
wife's bequest is satisfied with appreciated assets, the capital gains prob-
lem 17 would arise; while a general depreciation of the value of assets
would result in "overfunding" the widow.' s
The following is a pecuniary formula clause:
If my wife survives me, I give to [her or the trustee] the following:
An amount equal to the maximum estate tax marital deduction (al-
lowable in determining the federal estate tax payable by reason of my
death) minus the value for federal estate tax purposes of all items in
my gross estate which qualify for said deduction and which pass or
have passed in a form which qualifies for the estate tax marital deduc-
tion from me to my said wife (the words "pass or have passed" shall
have the same meaning as such words shall have under the provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time of my death) under
other provisions of this will, by right of survivorship with respect to
jointly owned property, under settlement arrangements relating to
life insurance proceeds or otherwise than under this pecuniary bequest.' 9
In making the computations necessary to determine the amount of this
pecuniary estate tax marital deduction gift, values as finally determined
for federal estate tax purposes shall control.20 The payment of this
amount may be made wholly or partly in kind by transferring to [my
16. According to Wright, supra note 15, "income tax basis" should be used rather than
"estate tax values," since property acquired by the estate may not have an estate tax
value. However, for purposes of this discussion "estate tax value" language is more
illustrative of the questions involved.
17. See discussion under NATuRe AND UsE OF Tm MAmTAL DEDuc ON, supra.
18. Id.
19. This provision, allowing credit for value which otherwise passes to the wife, and
which qualifies for the marital deduction, is inserted to prevent "overfunding," i.e.
giving her more than necessary to secure the maximum marital deduction.
20. CAsNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 794, n. 25 (Supp. 1965).
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wife or the trustee] specific securities or other personal property at
values current at the date of distribution.21
IV. The pecuniary formula bequest, or transfer in trust, the amount to
be determined at estate tax values, with sharing of appreciation and de-
preciation to date of distribution.
Like the previous formula, this one permits great flexibility in the
selection of assets to satisfy the bequest. However, here the wife's share
is subject to changing values, with the attendant possibility that she may
receive a greatly diminished share (disastrous, if she requires much) or
a greatly inflated share (equally disastrous, tax-wise, because of the
overfunding). Obviously this type of clause should not be used where
such harmful changes of value can be foreseen.
This particular formula closely resembles the pure fractional share
formula, but it differs because it frees the fiduciary from having to divide
up each class of assets, an often impossible task. Of course, use of this
formula avoids the capital gains problem, as is true of the fractional
share formula.
To utilize this type of bequest, simply replace the last sentence in the
basic pecuniary formula clause set out in subsection III above with the
following:
The assets to be distributed in satisfaction of this bequest will be
selected in such manner that cash and other property distributed will
have an aggregate fair market value fairly representative of the dis-
tributee's proportionate share of the appreciation or depreciation in
the value to the date, or dates, of distribution of all property then
available for distribution. 22
V. The pecuniary bequest, or transfer in trust (either formula or
stated amount), to be satisfied in kind 'with assets to be valued for distri-
bution at their federal estate tax values.
Before evaluating this type of clause one should be made aware that
its use has been rendered most inadvisable in light of Revenue Procedure
64-19.2s
This form was specifically developed to avoid the capital gains prob-
21. ld. at 816.
22. From Sugarman, Pecuniary Formula Marital Deduction Bequests: Application of
Revenue Procedure 64-19, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 257, 277 (1965).
23. See discussion under REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19, infra.
[Vol. 8:661
REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
lem; and indeed it did accomplish this end, for no change in value of the
assets was to be considered at distribution-the only governing values
for distribution purposes were to be estate tax values. Furthermore, the
executor would have great leeway in selecting assets according to their
behavior after the death of the testator. It is apparent that under such
a clause the fiduciary could divert .the stable or grossly appreciated
assets to the children, while appropriating depreciated (or perhaps
worthless) assets to the wife. Consider the following example:
$1,000,000 adjusted gross estate, 24 consisting of
ABC Corp. Stock XYZ Corp. Stock
Estate Tax Value $500,000 $500,000
Distribution Date Value 100,000 900,000
If the executor may consider only estate tax values upon distribution, he
can satisfy the wife's bequest with the ABC Corp. stock (which has
greatly depreciated) while the children can receive the XYZ Corp. stock
(which has greatly appreciated). Yet the estate would have received
the benefit of the full marital deduction, despite the discrepancy in
value received.
This seems to be the perfect solution, for the estate would get the
maximum marital deduction and would realize no capital gain; the
children would take most of the value at distribution; and the surviving
spouse would be happily "underfunded," taking little actual value to be
taxed upon later sale, gift, or bequest. Thus came a statement of dis-
approval by the Internal Revenue Service.
REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
Revenue Procedure 64-1925 is directed toward pecuniary bequests
(whether dollar amount or formula) where the executor may (or must)
satisfy the gift in kind with assets at their federal estate tax values.
Under such a provision the marital deduction will be disallowed, regard-
less of how distribution actually occurs, unless it is clear "either by
applicable state law or by the express or implied provisions of the
iu_ rument... that the fiduciary.. ." is bound exclusively by one of the
following alternatives:
24. See supra note 5.
25. 1 CuM. BULL. 682 (1964).
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(1) He "must distribute assets, including cash, having an aggregate
fair market value at the date, or dates, of distribution amounting to
no less than the amount of the pecuniary bequest .... , 26 (the "mini-
mum value" approach) or
(2) He "must distribute assets, including cash, fairly representative
of appreciation or depreciation in the value of all property thus avail-
able . . ." for satisfaction of the marital bequest (the "ratable sharing"
approach) .27
The Procedure expressly does not apply to a bequest, or transfer in
trust, of specific assets; 2 or to a fractional share bequest, or transfer in
trust.29 Nor does it apply to a pecuniary gift (whether a formula or
stated amount) if the fiduciary must satisfy the bequest only in cash;
if he has no discretion in selecting the assets to be distributed in kind; or
if the assets selected to be distributed in kind must be accorded their
values at the time of distribution. °
Section (3) of the Procedure3' provides that the marital deduction
may still be allowed under an offending instrument which was executed
before October 1, 1964, if the fiduciary and the surviving spouse enter
into certain prescribed agreements. The agreements in effect say that
the executor will use the "ratable sharing" approach in distributing the
assets; and that the widow, to the extent she does not fully share in ap-
preciation, will be deemed to have made a gift over to the other dis-
tributees, thereby incurring a gift tax when appropriate under the In-
ternal Revenue Code.32
26. Id. § 2.02 at 683.
27. Ibid.
28. id. § 4.01 at 684. For analysis of such a bequest, see discussion under MARITAL DE-
DUcTION CLAusEs, subsection L, supra.
29. Ibid. For an example and analysis of such a bequest, see MARITAL DEDUCTION
CLAusEs, subsection I1., supra.
30. Ibid. For an example and analysis of such a bequest, see MARITAL DEDUTION
CLAusEs, subsection III, supra.
One writer speculated that, where the surviving spouse is the sole executor, his "dis-
cretion would appear to be subject to the same basic objection from the standpoint of
the Treasury as such discretion granted in the fiduciary" (Lloyd, Background of
Drafting Problems, 103 TRusTs & EsTATEs 898, 900 [19641). However, the Internal
Revenue Service later declared its position that the Procedure would not apply where
the wife is the sole executrix, and that any discrepancy in value distributed would be
treated as a gift (Mr. Mitchell Rogovin, then-Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service,
The Sound and the Fury, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 432 [1965]).
31. 1 CuM. BuLL. 682, 683-684 (1964).
32. The gift tax provisions of the INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954 may be found in §§ 2501-2524.
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Much initial comment regarding the Procedure concerned the effect
of amending a "pre-October 1, 1964" will by codicil, which act "re-
executes" the will as of the date of amendment. Most writers were
concerned that such re-execution would disqualify an estate from
eligibility to take advantage of the agreements in order to save the
marital deduction.3s The Internal Revenue Service attempted to quiet
this anxiety by stating its position that, as long as the codicil did not
involve the marital bequest, the time of original execution of the instru-
ment would govern.34
REASONS FOR THE PROCEDURE
Why did the Internal Revenue Service issue Revenue Procedure 64-
19? One authority thought it was entirely unnecessary since, even under
the broad discretion given the executor under the offending clause a
fiduciary must act fairly toward all beneficiaries, he therefore could
not satisfy the wife's bequest with the depreciated assets.35 However,
he indicated that the Treasury probably feared collusion between the
spouse and the executor whereby they might "play games" with the
assets to achieve the desired result.3 6
Section (2.03) of the Procedure states that, if the fiduciary's discre-
tion is not limited to one of the two alternatives 7 when the condemned
clause is used, "the interest in property passing from the decedent to
his surviving spouse would not be ascertainable as of the date of death."3s
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue 9 emphasizes that, unless the re-
quirements of the Procedure are fulfilled, the executor will have the
power to appoint part of the marital deduction bequest to persons other
than the surviving spouse, a further reason for disallowance of the de-
duction. 40 Furthermore, the Commissioner says that allowing the
marital deduction in such a case would give this tax benefit to the estate
33. See, e.g., Lauritzen, supra note 2, at 397; Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula
Clauses in Estate Planning-Estate and Income Tax Considerations, 63 MICH. L. REV.
809, 826 (1965).
34. See Rogovin, supra note 30, at 435; P-H Esr. PLANNING, FED. EST. & GIFT TAXEs,
Vol. 3, 142,066.
35. See, e.g., Lauritzen, supra note 2, at 318-319.
36. Id. at 319.
37. See discussion under REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19, supra, concerning the "minimum
value" and "ratable sharing" approaches.
38. 1 CuM. BuLL. 682, 683 (1964).
39. Mr. Sheldon S. Cohen in Treasury Views on Current Questions, 104 Tuvs &
ESTArES 9 (1965).
40. See, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2065 (b) (5); Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(j) (1958).
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for property which never passed to the wife, and which would not
become part of the wife's estate upon her death. 41 The Commissioner
also states that the wife's basis for the depreciated property is the higher,
estate tax value, thus giving her a potential capital loss if she disposes
of it.42 Also, the provision for the signed agreements was not inserted
to prevent misdealing, but rather it serves to inform both the fiduciary
and the spouse of exactly what is required. Where the wife has pre-
deceased actual distribution of her husband's estate, the agreements also
serve to bind her executors to claim a share of any appreciation, rather
than just the dollar amount of the marital bequest.4
NEW "HYBRID" PECUNIARY FORMULA BEQUEST
One consequence of the Procedure has been the advocacy of a
so-called "hybrid" pecuniary formula clause, which appears to satisfy
the "minimum value" test.44 The clause provides that the pecuniary
amount may be . . .
satisfied either by distribution in cash, or a distribution in kind
but to the extent a distribution in kind is made, the property ... must
be assigned as its value in satisfying the pecuniary amount, its [estate
tax value] or its value as of the date of distribution, whichever is lower. 45
41. Cohen, supra note 39, at 9.
42. Ibid. The Commissioner's statement seems consistent with the general concept
that satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest with assets is a sale or exchange (see discus-
sion under NATURE AND USE OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION, supra). Thus, the wife's basis is
what she paid for the assets, i.e. her claim against the estate for a specific dollar amount.
However, a literal reading of Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (3) (1957) suggests otherwise.
It states that, where the transfer constitutes a sale or exchange, the wife's basis is the
fair market value of the assets at the time of distribution (also see supra note 3, at 714).
However, it also provides that the transferor must recognize any gain or loss, as required
by the revenue laws. So, perhaps this basis provision only applies where a capital gain
may be realized (such cannot happen under the offending clause); and the examples in
the Regulation only concern situations where a capital gain is recognized.
Furthermore, the Regulation declares that, in case of a fractional bequest, no capital
gain or loss can be realized; and the legatee's basis for the property received would be
its value as of the date of death (or alternate date). It would seem that the offending
clause presents an analogous situation, since no gain can be recognized thereunder, and
the actual value to be received by the wife is an unknown factor. This concept would
classify a distribution under the condemned clause somewhere between a sale or ex-
change under a pecuniary bequest, and a direct passage of property under a fractional
share bequest.
43. Mr. John T. Sheets, Estate & Gift Tax Branch, Internal Revenue Service in
Practical Solutions to 64-19, 104 TRUSTS & ESTATES 71 (1965).
44. See discussion under REVENUE PRocFDuRE 64-19, supra.
45. CASNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 816, n.64 (Supp. 1965). See also Colson, The
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The test is satisfied, for the fiduciary is required to satisfy the marital
gift with value at least equal to the marital deduction. Under this
clause the wife cannot share in any general depreciation, but she may
share in any appreciation of value.
This "hybrid" clause allows for considerable flexibility and post-
mortem planning, since the executor has wide discretion in the selection
of assets. Furtherfore, as long as the wife is given the minimum marital
deduction value, the fiduciary is not bound to allocate to her share any
appreciation (thus avoiding "overfunding"). Also, by diverting ap-
preciation to the residuary trust (or to the other distributees) it will
escape taxation upon the death of the wife. Another beneficial aspect
is that there can be no capital gain realized by the estate, for even if
appreciated assets are used to satisfy the bequest, they are to be allocated
at estate tax values. Thus the estate would not be settling a claim for less
than its basis of the assets distributed. 46
It is reassuring to know that this "hybrid" clause has the blessing of
the Internal Revenue Service.4? However, the attorney must realize that
there are some circumstances under which this particular clause should
not be employed. One author warns that, where the wife or the resid-
uary beneficiary is the sole executor, or either is co-executor with a
bank, the discretionary power to select the assets may result in imposi-
tion of a gift tax where appreciation is diverted away from the execu-
tor's share.46 Nor should this clause be used where the testator desires
a charitable deduction for the residuary trust,49 since the marital bequest
is represented by a minimum, but no maximum value. Thus, all ap-
preciated assets might be allocated to the marital gift, while all depre-
ciated assets could go into the residue. The redult would be an uncer-
tainty of interest in the charitable bequest, with the possibility that it
would receive even less than its estate tax value, designated for the de-
duction." If the charitable legacy were made specific (in a will using
the "hybrid" marital deduction clause), certainly one of the two de-
ductions could not be allowed; for, if the estate depreciates in value,
it might not be possible to satisfy both the marital deduction and the
Marital Deduction and Revenue Procedure 64-19, 10 PRAc. LAw. 69, 76-77 (Oct. 1964);
Weinstock, The Marital Deduction-Problems and Answers under Revenue Procedure
64-19, 43 TAxEs 340, 346 (1965); Wright, supra note 15, at 108-109.
46. Wright, supra note 15, at 106.
47. Rogovin, supra note 30, at 433.
48. Wright, supra note 15, at 109.
49. Ibid. For the charitable deduction provisions, see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2055.
50. Wright, supra note 15, at 109.
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charitable deduction bequests, and it is such possibilities which disallow
a deduction, regardless of what actually occurs. Finally, this minimum
value approach should not be used where asset depreciation can reason-
ably be foreseen, unless it is the testator's purpose to assure a minimum
value for the marital gift.
"APPLICABLE STATE LAW"
Under a condemned pecuniary clause, the marital deduction will be
allowed where "by applicable state law" the fiduciary is bound by either
the "minimum value" test or the "ratable sharing" test.51 However, only
a gambling testator or executor would act on the belief that there is
sufficient state law to assure compliance with the Procedure. One writer
argued that the requirement should always be satisfied, since a fiduciary
must act according to basic equitable principles.5 2 Others declared that
in only Illinois, 53 New York, and "perhaps" Oregon 54 was the case law
certain enough on the matter, at the time the Procedure was issued.
Another writer claims knowledge of but four states where the fiduciary
must use distribution date values, where the instrument is silent as to
mode of valuation. 55
The first reaction to the obvious gap in definitive state law occurred in
Mississippi, where the legislature passed a law requiring the fiduciary to
choose either the "minimum value" approach or the "ratable sharing"
approach in the applicable situation. 6 However, it soon became apparent
that this law only made matters worse; for, by forcing him to select one
or the other of the methods, the statute actually compelled the fiduciary
to exercise the very discretion which would serve to disallow the marital
deduction. 57 Since he could still manipulate the various interests after
the death of the testator (indeed, if the estate appreciated he could use
the "minimum value" method, while if it depreciated he could use the
51. See discussion under REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19, supra.
52. Lauritzen, The Estate Tax Marital Deduction, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 318, 318-319
(1964) (citing cases in point).
53. Cantwell, Statutory Relief, 104 TRuSrs & ESTATES 953 (1965).
54. Ibid.; see also, Covey, Statutory Panacea for 64-19, 104 TRusTs & ESTATEs 69
(1965).
55. Wright, The Marital Deduction since Revenue Procedure 64-19, 106 TRUSTS
& EsrATEs 101, 107 (1967).
56. Miss. Gen. Acts 1964, S. No. 2059 § 1.
57. See Note, Marital Deduction Pecuniary Formula Bequests: Revenue Procedure
64-19 and N.Y. Personal Property Law § 17-f, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 262, 267-268 (1966);
Cantwell, supra note 53, at 953; Cohen, supra note 39, at 10; Covey, supra note 54, at 69.
[Vol. 8:661
REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
"ratable sharing" method) the interests would be neither ascertainable
nor non-terminable. Fortunately, this problem is now academic, since
the law was repealed and replaced in 1966.58
At this time thirteen states have passed legislation to satisfy the de-
mands of the Procedure. Eleven of the statutes adopt some form of the
"ratable sharing" test,59 while New York has overturned its qualifying
case law 0 by enacting a type of "minimum value" statute,61 which
direction was also pursued by California.62
The Virginia statute-the "ratable sharing" approach.
Having the advantage of hindsight regarding Mississippi's unfortunate
error, Virginia passed corrective legislation which binds the fiduciary
to follow the "ratable sharing" approach.63  Basically, the statute re-
quires the fiduciary to value the assets as of the time of distribution, un-
less the governing instrument specifically provides otherwise. This pro-
vision settles any question as to time of valuation where the will is silent
on the matter. Furthermore, where the will directs use of estate tax
values (or any date other than that of distribution), the executor must
satisfy the bequest by apportioning any depreciation or appreciation,
unless the instrument clearly calls for the "minimum value" approach.
Thus, under such a "ratable sharing" statute, the estate will lose the
marital deduction only where the instrument forbids pro rata sharing
in value fluctuation, and where it is silent as to fulfillment of the "mini-
mum value" test.64
Whether this type of statute is the better will depend upon the result
58. Miss. Gen. Acts 1964, S. No. 2059 § 1 was repealed. It was replaced by a "ratable
sharing" statute which became effective May 20, 1966. Miss. CODE ANN. § 644.7 (Supp.
1966). This act applies "to wills of decedents dying before or after" May 20, 1966 (§ 2),
and "is not intended to imply that the present law of the State . . . has been other-
wise ... ." (§ 3).
59. COLO. REVISED STATS. ANN. (citation unavailable); FLA. STATS. ANN. § 734.031 (Supp.
1966); ANN. CODE OF MD. Art. 93, § 392 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STATS. ANN. ch. 765,
§ 525.528 (Supp. 1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 644.7 (Supp. 1966); GEN. STATS. OF N.C.
§ 28-158.1 (Supp. 1965); PAGE'S OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1339.41 (Curr. Material); CODE:
OF LAWS OF S.C. § 19-567 (Supp. 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1317 (Supp. 1965); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64-71.2 (Supp. 1966); WEsT's Wis. STATS. ANN. § 318.15 (Supp. 1967).
60. Note, supra note 57, at 269, citing case law and a private letter ruling by the
Internal Revenue Service, acknowledging New York's "ratable sharing" requirement.
61. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 17-f (Supp. 1966).
62. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 1029 (Supp. 1966).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 64-71.2 (Supp. 1966).
64. The Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 181, 251 (1967).
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of each case where it is applied. Of course, it eliminates the capital gains
and charitable residuary problems;65 but, at the same time, it effectively
ignores the intent of the testator, since a type of fractional share is sub-
stituted for a dollar amount legacy.6 6 However, an effective counter to
this argument is the probable governing intent of the testator to secure
the marital deduction, rather than to lose it because of a refusal to ap-
portion fluctuation in value. Also, it is said that this type of statute yields
more equitable results, for all beneficiaries share in any appreciation or
depreciation. 67 This argument is certainly valid in a situation where the
executor is not otherwise required to follow any particular standard in
distributing the assets.68
The New York and California statutes-the "minimum value" approach.
The New York response to Revenue Procedure 64-19 was enactment
of a statute requiring the executor to distribute assets having a value,
at time of distribution, "no less than" the amount of the pecuniary be-
quest, and "to the extent practicable" no more than that amount .6  This
legislation requires satisfaction of the gift with value equal to the
pecuniary amount, with the added leeway that, in dividing up the
property, the fiduciary may appropriate a greater value to the marital
gift if ease of administration so requires. It is recited in the code section
that this law represents an ". . . aggregate value rule which carries out,
as nearly as possible, the intention of the testator . . . to give a fixed
amount not subject to fluctuation." 70
It is difficult to tell what this definite-minimum, yet only reasonably
certain-maximum test will yield in terms of the charitable deduction and
capital gains problems. 71 Perhaps the Internal Revenue Service will
examine each situation to see whether there is any real question as to the
65. In this respect, its operation resembles a fractional share bequest, with sharing of
appreciation or depreciation. See discussion under MARITAL DEoucTioN CLAUSES, sub-
section I, supra.
66. Covey, supra note 54, at 70.
67. Note, Estate Tax Marital Deduction-Compliance with Revenue Procedure 64-19,
18 VAND. L. REv. 319, 323 (1964).
68. It is interesting to note that the Minnesota "ratable sharing" statute (supra note
59) contains a "dangerous exception" (Cantwell, supra note 53, at 954) which converts
every pecuniary bequest into a "ratable sharing" formula, unless the instrument specifi-
cally refers to the statute, declaring that it shall not apply.
69. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 17-f (Supp. 1966).
70. Ibid. See "Note of Commission."
71. See Note, supra note 57, at 271.
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precise interests involved. Certainly, if the amount of the pecuniary
bequest is satisfied with greatly appreciated assets, a capital gains tax will
be imposed.
Because of the mild confusion inherent in the New York statute,
some writers would prefer a simple "equal to" statute to meet the
"minimum value" test.72 Such legislation would comply with the testa-
tor's intent that the wife receive a fixed dollar amount, but it would
also effectively ignore the "estate tax value" language of the instrument.
Again, however, the primary purpose of the testator is usually to obtain
the maximum marital deduction. Certainly, where affirmation of this
desire is evidenced by a "bootstrap" clause, ignoring the "estate tax
value" language may be readily justified.73
California chose to use the language of the Revenue Procedure in
requiring that the property distributed have a value "no less than" the
amount of the bequest. 74 As long as the property distributed has an
estate basis at least equal to the minimum amount to be satisfied, there
should be no capital gains tax imposed. However, serious problems may
confront the executor, for he is under a duty to act impartially as to all
beneficiaries. Since the California statute establishes only a minimum and
no maximum amount, the fiduciary is seriously lacking in guidelines
when he must decide on a proper distribution of assets. Theoretically, he
could allocate the entire estate to the marital gift, leaving the residuary
beneficiaries out completely. This, of course, could hardly be called
impartiality, and such action' would most certainly be a breach of
fiduciary duties.
There are some other generally recognized detrimental aspects of
"minimum value" legislation. First, the wide discretion of the executor
may render the charitable residuary interest unascertainable, terminable,
and therefore non-deductible.75 Also, if the estate severely depreciates
in value, there might be nothing left for the other legatees, after satis-
faction in full of the marital gift. Of course, this result would not
obtain under a "ratable sharing" statute where all interests would share
in fluctuations of value. Finally, overfunding the wife's interest is a
concomitant problem, in case of asset depreciation.
72. See, e.g., Cantwell, supra note 53, at 954; Covey, supra note 54, at 70.
73. Covey, supra note 54, at 70.
74. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 1029 (Supp. 1966). Although California is a community
property state, this statute will apply to that non-community property which falls into
the adjusted gross estate. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 2056 (c) (2) (B).
75. See discussion under NEw "HYBRID" PECUNIARY FoRMuLA BEQUEsT, supra.
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A "preferred solution?"
One writer has proffered a legislative solution to the adversities of
adopting one or the other of the alternatives. 7 The statute would pro-
vide that, under an offending will, a local court would determine whether
the decedent intended a dollar amount legacy, or whether he intended
a fractional share. Upon this determination the law would require ap-
plication of the "equal to" approach if a legacy, or the "ratable sharing"
approach if a fractional share was intended. This, says the proponent,
would least subvert the testator's intent, while assuring qualification for
the marital deduction.77 The "estate tax value" language, under this
statute, would not automatically be construed so as to convert an in-
tended legacy into a fractional share. Furthermore, the charitable de-
duction problem would not appear,78 and the capital gains question
could arise only if judicial construction indicates an intent to use the
dollar amount legacy. However, it is recognized that such a statute
is simply a "method of ignoring 'estate tax value' language and . . .
giving lip service to the decedent's presumed intent. . . ." 9
This type of approach was considered by the state of Florida"0 but
it was subsequently rejected in favor of a "ratable sharing" statute,," so
it has not yet been enacted in any jurisdiction.
EXECUTING THE AGREEMENTS OF REVENUE PROCEDURE 64-19
The agreements set out in the Procedure 2 are, of course, required
to correct a condemned "pre-October 1, 1964" instrument only where
state law is insufficient or uncertain regarding the two tests discussed
in the Procedure.83 It should be pointed out that two of the states which
have passed corrective legislation concerning the duties of the fiduciary,
have also expressly authorized the making of any agreement which as-
sures allowance of the marital deduction, and the performance of all acts
incident thereto. 4
76. Covey, supra note 54, at 70.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Cantvell, supra note 53, at 953.
82. See discussion under REvENUE PROCEDURE 64-19, supra.
83. Ibid.
84. GEN. STATs. OF N.C. § 28-158.2 (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-71.2 (Supp. 1966).
Mississippi had also authorized the making of such agreements (Miss. Gen. Acts of 1964,
S. No. 2060 § 1), but this law has been repealed, supra note 58, and the new statute, supra
note 58, does not have this provision.
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When the agreement would be required to secure the marital de-
duction, there may still be a question of whether the fiduciary has the
power to enter into it. Indeed, a change in the terms of the will is
involved, since a pecuniary bequest is thereby converted into a fractional
share; and such alteration of the instrument is contrary to the case law
of some jurisdictions.85 Executing the agreement would also be beyond
the executor's power where the testator's primary intent may be con-
strued as precisely determining the wife's share, rather than securing
the marital deduction.86 Furthermore, the possible adverse effect of the
agreement upon the other beneficiaries (in case of appreciation, the wife
must share therein8 7) may be deemed a violation of the executor's duty
of impartiality toward all the legatees.88 However, one authority sug-
gests that executing the agreement may well be considered consistent
with the broad discretion regarding distribution of the assets granted by
the decedent."9
Entering into the agreement would surely be a violation of the
executor's duties where the instrument may reasonably be construed
as requiring some approach other than "ratable sharing." 90 Indeed,
where state case law would require construing the clause as a fixed sum,
the agreement would clearly be proscribed.91
As to when the agreements must be filed, the Internal Revenue Service
suggests that they accompany the return, although they would be ac-
cepted as late as the time of auditing the estate. 92
CONCLUSION
The initial fear provoked by Revenue Procedure 64-19 has since sub-
sided. The validity and the value of responsive state legislation have
been well evaluated, so that those jurisdictions which have thus far
abstained from enacting statutes might proceed, in order that a poorly
structured clause can be prevented from causing disallowance of the
85. See Lauritzen, supra note 52, at 320.
86. Sugarman, Pecuniary Formula Marital Deduction Bequests: Application of
Revenue Procedure 64-19, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 257, 267 (1965).
87. See discussion under REvENuE PRocEiDmm 64-19, supra.
88. See Polasky, Marital Deduction Formula Clauses in Estate Planning-Estate and
Income Tax Considerations, 63 MicH. L. REv. 809, 823 (1965).
89. Id. at 823-824.
90. Sugarman, supra note 86, at 267.
91. See Note, Marital Deduction Clauses, 53 GEo. L. J. 791, 782-793 (1965) (citing cases
in point).
92. Sheets, supra note 43, at 72.
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marital deduction. Only experience can indicate what form the legisla-
tion should take, but there seems ample logic for enacting the "preferred
solution," 91 which has so far been rejected. While some legislatures
might hesitate to burden their courts further with the duty to construe
the donor's intent, hopefully there would be very few cases where the
condemned clause would appear so as to raise the issue. In any event,
it is apparent that legislation which clearly defines the duties of the
fiduciary in a "Revenue Procedure 64-19" situation would serve the
vital function of releasing him from any doubt-provoked hesitancy to
act; and the beneficiaries would be made equally certain of what they
may expect.
Although the automatic tax avoidance of certain property in com-
munity property states is a decided advantage over the occasional un-
certainty of achieving the marital deduction, the Procedure has certainly
clarified the law in one hazy estate planning area.9 4 Where "alia acta est,"
the attorney should be able to determine the feasibility and advisability
of entering into the requisite agreements. Furthermore, the diligent
lawyer who has full knowledge and understanding of the problems
and solutions under the Procedure, should be able to draft an instrument
which will comply with its requirements. A trite but true statement is
that each estate is unique, and ultimately the most satisfactory results
will obtain where thoughtful planning prevails. Under the present law
there is always some gamble involved in each case in regard to satis-
fying fully the wishes of the testator, but it is up to the draftsman to
achieve the best odds for the estate.
Charles E. Kent
93. See discussion under APPLICABLE STATE LAW, "A Preferred Solution?" supra.
94. While the present status of the law seems quite clear, ominous notes regarding
the future occasionally sound. For example, in Tax Clinic, J. ACCOUNTANCY 75, 76
(January, 1967), it is stated that "From a technical standpoint, one government
official asserts that with [marital deduction formulas] nothing really qualifies for the
marital deduction, since there is no vesting at the time of death. Instead, there are con-
tingencies that must abide the outcome of estate tax values and the determination of
whether expenses are taken in the income tax return or the estate tax return."
If this idea were to prevail, it is conceivable that the only sure way to secure the
marital deduction would be to use a specific bequest, with all its attendant disadvantages.
Such a change in position by the Treasury would certainly cause great outcries of dis-
approval. Perhaps the only tenable solution would be for Congress to set out precisely
what will and what will not qualify for the marital deduction. In light of the uncer-
tainty that such a solution would be provided, one may readily envision a race by the
state legislatures to enact community property laws, to protect their estates from the
possible caprices of administrators. Hopefully, no such crisis will arise.
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